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Q Mr. Secretary, do you see any danger in the seemingly growing tendency on the part of your Department and the White House to equate disagreement with disloyalty and to maybe even deny the right to that disagreement as seemingly indicated by the Administration's reaction to Senator Fulbright's speech?

A Could you quote me the Administration's reaction to Senator Fulbright's speech? I

Q [No response]

A I'm not particularly aware of any statements that the Administration has made on Senator Fulbright's speech.

I didn't agree with it. But let's not confuse two things here. I got into this problem myself not very long ago when I made some remarks about some things that were being said by certain of our people on the campus. I said some of the things they were saying was nonsense. This was interpreted as suggesting that I was trying somehow to inhibit their freedom of speech. I wasn't trying to do that. I was simply trying to use some of it myself.

[Laughter]

Because I thought what they were saying was nonsense.

[Applause]

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I think that we have a full understanding of the difference between a disagreement and disloyalty. Now, let's don't pretend that there aren't a little of both. There are some of both in this country, because there is an apparatus which is trying to discredit this country in a great variety of ways. That does not mean that those who disagree are a part of that apparatus. But we have, and must have, in this country a vigorous public debate on the great national issues.

But I would suggest that we in Government are entitled to participate in it fully without anyone supposing that we are charging disloyalty because we tell somebody we don't agree with him and think that the course he is talking about is disastrous.

Q Mr. Secretary?

A Yes, sir?

Q I have two very short questions.

A All right, sir.

Q What is your interpretation, for example, of the impact of Pope Paul's visit for peace? One question. And can you tell me what's going on in Indonesia?

A On the first question, I believe that his visit to New York and his statement to the General Assembly was a sobering statement and did cause those who heard it to feel the need for a fresh dedication to the

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the Charter and to the purposes of peace. It was not-- as you know, the statement itself was not specific in terms of how to get there in particular issues. But, nevertheless, I think it's good for all of us to be reminded from time to time that there is no real substitute for peace and that we better get our minds to work on it all the time, 24 hours a day, right around the clock.

On Indonesia, quite frankly I can't tell you very much about it. You gentlemen are getting, through your tickers, just about as much information as we are getting because the personalities are not easy to be in touch with; the government is not functioning in the usual way in discussing these problems with foreign representatives; the situation is still somewhat obscure although it appears that the army is asserting general control over at least the processes of law and order in the countryside.

We do believe that the Communists were involved in that effort of the 30th of September. But just to what extent and for what purpose and with whose collaboration or leadership, we are not at all sure. I think it will take some days yet for that situation to clarify. Obviously the stakes are rather large, because what

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happens there in a country of a hundred million people can have a considerable effect in the entire Southeast Asia situation, and, indeed, in world affairs.

But we don't feel we have a very clear picture of it. But if we are somewhat confused, it may be that we are simply in touch with reality. It is a confusing situation. And it is not clear to the Indonesians. And you're getting just about as much as we are getting on the details.

Q Do you think there will be a Communist takeover there?

A I don't want to be a prophet, but I would think the chances are now rather slight that there would be a straight Communist takeover in the usual sense. But the P.K.I. is moving pretty well in its attempt to extend its influence before the recent incidents occurred. And I gather that at the present moment the armed forces are making their influence much more strongly felt.

Q Thank you.

A All right, sir.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary, the Pope made a reference to birth control and in effect pleading with the United Nations not to concern itself with that as a matter of

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transiently
policy. I was wondering if the Pope's position, either conflicts head on or *(transiently)* with the United States' position in this matter?

[Laughter]

A Our own position has been, and is, that these are--that the policy aspects of this question are to be determined by each country, and as far as most of us are concerned by the individual citizens or persons involved; that where we are asked for assistance we will try to provide it.

Now, I don't know what the effect of the statement yesterday will be on the final position taken at the Council on this matter, but I would think that it would be a certain indication of the position that would be taken at the Council. But this is a matter that basically is determined in each country among the citizens or the government of the particular countries.

We feel that it is a very important matter. Of course we have to work on the other side of the ledger and try to do everything that we can to improve the capacity of nature to support the population of country after country. But it is true that the explosion birth rates are a major problem for development and create very large problems of a social and humane type, let alone the very important economic considerations involved.

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So we are not trying ourselves to make this decision for anybody else. But if we are asked for assistance, we try to find various ways in which to give assistance in this field.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary, with all these new nations being formed, many of which want to flex their muscles against the major powers, to what extent do you think the United States will have to take some action to protect itself in the United Nations in the foreseeable future when these small nations will control the vote?

A Well, this is a pretty interesting and important question for us because it is quite true that 10 percent of the world's population can cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly and that 5 percent of the contributors of the contributions to the United Nations, which cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly; for example, last year at the UNESCO meeting in passing the budget, 6 percent of the contributions passed the budget; 94 percent of the contributions, including the United States, voted against that budget.

Now, this offers some problems similar to, I suppose, the reapportionment doctrines of the Supreme Court. But we have ourselves studied the question of weighted voting, setting aside for the moment the

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political possibility of bringing about adjustments in voting procedure. We did look at 15 different weighted voting formulas based upon population, gross national product, contributions to the UN and all sorts of other factors. And we put these formulas through computers to compare the results with the actual results obtained on some 275 key issues voted on in the United Nations in the last seven years. We have not been able to find a weighted voting formula that would have improved the American position in that voting pattern.

[Laughter]

Now, one of the reasons for that is that in general, ¹⁷[in general] and looking at the total membership of 175, and the hundred items on the agenda of the UN each year, that in the broadest sense we find ourselves working with the great majority of the General Assembly on most questions.

Now, on this specific question of finances, as you know, we did in connection with this Article 19 issue point out that if the General Assembly was going to permit the Soviet Union and France to exercise options, that we reserved the right to exercise the same options ourselves.

I do not believe that this provides a final

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answer to the finances of the United Nations. I think they will have to look at it hard and try to find some way to get those finances on a more solid and firm footing.

But this is a problem. Look ahead for a little bit here. That we have just recently admitted Malta and the Maldiv Islands. Now, that is 117. Where do we go from there? Can you add ³⁰50 more members, 50 more members? You have the Trucials and you have 12 or 15 possibilities in the Caribbean. We could offer them two dozen or so in the Pacific. Where does it go, you see? So in the Assembly they are beginning to think about the problem of minimum standards for membership, or some sort of special arrangement to have adequate representatives.

All of the remaining pieces that become free now from some sort of other jurisdiction, I can't give you. I can't suggest to you what the answer on that will be, but it's a problem that we are very much alert to and are working on very hard.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary, a good six months ago in a session I think you made the observation that customarily when peace overtures have begun you heard from private sources that reliable undertakings will result in whether you go forward. Has anything happened in the

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past six months to persuade you that you may look forward to these private sources for giving these or are things getting worse?

A I don't think they are getting worse. That would be a little hard to imagine as far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, unless we move to general war.

We are in constant contact with the other side. The problem is not one of channels of communication. Among other things, the world is filled with volunteers who would love to be the key communicant that establishes the touch which leads to peace in this situation. And there are other means of contact which are used as a matter of conducting your business in a responsible fashion.

We have not yet found or heard the key signal. As a matter of fact, there was a broadcast from Tokyo in the last--well, I saw the ticker this morning, an interview with the Foreign Minister of Hanoi, who seemed to make it very clear that they are not interested in discussions or peaceful settlement or a conference or anything of that sort, unless we are prepared to accept in advance the four points which they have advanced some months ago for the settlement of the South Vietnamese problem.

Without going into all of the theology of those

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four points, one of those points is the full acceptance of the program of the Viet Cong for South Viet-Nam. Now, we have said, as you know, that we will talk about anybody's point of view if they come to a conference, including our own. If they want to come to a conference and put their point of view, they can do so. But there is going to be no acceptance of their Liberation Front program for South Viet-Nam and the South Vietnamese people.

Whatever their differences among themselves, they seem to be solidly opposed to what the Viet Cong and the Front are trying to offer them. So we have not yet had picked up anything on our antenna that suggests that this thing can move promptly toward a peaceful settlement.

Q Mr. Secretary?

A Here and then over here [indicating].
Excuse me, you were lost in the light.

Q We have some 650 million people behind the Bamboo Curtain. Will there come a time when you recognize all these people exist?

A We know they exist. We know they exist. We have got three or four hundred thousand men within easy reach of Mainland China. We have to for defense in Korea and around the perimeter. We are in touch with

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them frequently. We are very much aware that they exist.

Now, the problem is the basis on which they are prepared to co-exist. And at that point things get to be a little rough. It isn't easy to get these veterans of the long march in Peiping, these primitive Marxists of an earlier day, to concede that war is disastrous for all concerned and to commit themselves to the necessity for living on the same planet in reasonable peace.

Now, I would have to say they are more cautious in their actions than they are in their words, and there is some hope in that fact. But I think their problem is not that of technical or formal recognition. Indeed, in view of what they say about Formosa in our talks in Warsaw, one could imagine that if you offered them bilateral recognition without surrendering Formosa they would turn it down. They would turn it down. They would say there is nothing to discuss, they are not interested in any kind of talk until we are prepared to surrender Formosa, which we are not going to do.

Q Mr. Secretary?

A I think there is a question over here [indicating].

Q Mr. Secretary, in recent months and even over a longer period of time, there have been some rather acid criticism^s of the role of the CIA in various situations

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in which we found ourselves. A few weeks ago in Portland you made some remarks in regard to that. Would you care to expand upon those, sir?

A I wouldn't care to, no, sir.

[Laughter]

But on this subject, let's on this BACKGROUND session try to be clear about one or two things. The Communist world, including that Western part of it that is somewhat more prudent and is talking about peaceful co-existence these days, the Communist world hasn't had a change of heart. Their objectives are still the world revolution. They would like to hang everybody in this room to the nearest lamp post if they had a chance.

And let's don't confuse ourselves on that point. And they are conducting their effort in whatever way is open to them, wherever they can. That produces a back-alley struggle in many places. It goes on continuously, week by week, month by month, throughout the year.

If you abandon that back-alley struggle to them, then they can move with great effectiveness and can deeply injure not only our own interests but the possibilities of peace and the independence of others. So they have to try to keep contact with that activity, try to know about it, try to find ways to deal with it. And in doing that we have to call upon some of our own people to do things

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that require gallantry and dedication and abilities of the highest order.

Once in a while things go wrong on both sides and people get upset and unsettled and wonder what kind of a world we are living in. We are living in a world which has a part of that law of the jungle in it. That is the kind of world we are in.

Now, I can assure you of this, that CIA does not undertake activities that do not have the policy approval of those who have policy responsibility. I will leave that point there. They are not a separate Department of State. They are not a separate Defense Department. They are the servants of the United States and I just leave that statement there.

But this is a tough game. This is a tough game. And I hope that we won't feel too embarrassed or too squeamish when something goes wrong here, because let me tell you it is a rough game and we have got to be sure that the other side doesn't run away with that aspect of it.

So I would hope you wouldn't get too nervous and upset about such a book as "The Invisible Government" and things like that, which is filled with a good many things that weren't just so. We are now--we are the object of a systematic effort by the other side to

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discredit CIA. I again have to come back to the point here, I am not going to connect every criticism of the CIA with a systematic effort to discredit it.

But there is such an effort going on. And we have been confronted in recent months with a series of planted forgeries, clearly and demonstrably forgeries, put there in an effort to effect just this job. And it is no accident that the book, "The Invisible Government" is something of a best seller in the Communist world. It has been given wide distribution in Africa by them. So this is one that we need to approach with considerable understanding of some of the unlovely aspects of the world in which we live.

But don't get the impression that a lot of people off in the bush somewhere in the woodwork are doing a lot of things that we don't know about, that we don't know about at the policy levels of government. Of course you don't want them to get caught. It's that simple.

All right.

Q How real is this?

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Excuse me. How real--

A Sorry. He was first, and then I will take you.